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Abstract  [209 words] 
 
This article draws upon the Chilcot Report to undertake a Foucauldian-influenced critique of 
the processes surrounding the creation of the Attorney General’s (AG) Iraq war advice.  It 
argues that four significant power/knowledge dynamics acted to construct the AG’s clear 
statement that military action was internationally lawful.  First, Blair-era lapses in record-
keeping and related ministerial disputes concerning the bureaucratic apparatus of writing 
acted to limit the available knowledge of Iraq-era events.  Second, the Blairite practice of 
highly selective sharing and management of information within government acted to foster 
knowledge asymmetries, making challenge or resistance more difficult.  Third, belatedly 
providing the AG with a highly partisan background knowledge ultimately informed his legal 
interpretation by tailoring the crucial informational context in which he drafted his advice.  
Fourth, the AG’s credibility and legal expertise were strategically traded upon to enhance the 
presentation of his legal statement to Cabinet, Parliament and the public.  These four practices 
acted cumulatively to produce a legal knowledge that instigated war and have remained 
influential in post-Iraq military actions, thus supporting Foucault’s thesis that power and 
knowledge are reciprocal.  Ultimately, this analysis reveals the that the definitive, clear legal 
‘green light’ authored by the singular, independent AG was a reifying liberal-constitutional 








So it goes.  This article investigates the circumstances surrounding the Attorney-General (AG) 
Lord Peter Goldsmith’s controversial legal advice in the lead-up to the UK’s military action 
in Iraq in March 2003.  Though well-known, the factual background is worth briefly 
recounting.  The engagement of UK troops was dependent on whether the action complied 
with international law, and the Attorney General, as legal adviser to the Crown,1 was the lead 
government lawyer charged with advising on this issue.  According to constitutional 
convention, the AG had the final word on the issue of international legality; his was the 
authoritative statement of law that held precedence over other views.2  Between 2002 and 
early 2003, Lord Goldsmith was consistently of the view that military action in Iraq was not 
permitted by international law, and viewed warfare without a second United Nations Security 
Council resolution (UNSCR) as unlawful as late as 30th January, just 7 weeks before the 
invasion.  Yet by 17th March 2003, just two days before military engagement, he provided a 
brief, clear statement3 confirming that military action would be internationally lawful on the 
basis of UNSCR 14414 alone, without the need for a second resolution.5  That contentious 
                                                          
All internet links last accessed on 11 April 2018. 
 
Many thanks to the Society of Legal Scholars for funding the Iraq: Legal-Political Legacies 
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1 Select Committee on the Constitution, ‘Reform of the Office of Attorney General’, HL (2007-8) 93 
[4]-[5].  See also: Constitutional Affairs Committee, ‘Constitutional Role of the Attorney General’, 
HC (2006-7) 306, [11], [68]. 
2  The Report of the Iraq Inquiry (chair: Sir John Chilcot) July 2016, volumes 1-12 
<http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/the-report/> vol 5(5) [797].  See, e.g.: Jack Straw, Oral evidence to 
Iraq Inquiry (8 February 2010) 23, <http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/95266/2010-02-08-
Transcript-Straw-S2.pdf>.  See also: Jack Straw, Witness statement to Iraq Inquiry (February 2010) 
[3], <http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/96018/2010-02-XX-Statement-Straw-2.pdf>; Sir 
Michael Wood, Oral evidence to Iraq Inquiry (26 January 2010) 35, 65, 
<http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/95218/2010-01-26-Transcript-Wood-S1.pdf>. 
3 Hansard HL vol 646, col: WA2-WA3 (17 March 2003). 
4 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1441 ((8 November 2002) UN Doc S/RES/1441) 
5 This was because UNSCR 1441 had declared Iraq to be in ‘material breach’ of its obligations to disarm 
under the 1990 UNSCR 678, and had thus ‘revived’ this earlier resolution authorising force against 





legal text has been subject to a great deal of scrutiny by international lawyers.6  Instead, this 
article examines the domestic constitutional context in which Lord Goldsmith’s ‘u-turn’ 
occurred.  In doing so it draws upon material obtained (and indeed produced) by the Iraq 
Inquiry.7   
 
This article employs a Foucauldian analysis of the 2016 Chilcot Report and evidence, 
demonstrating that power/knowledge dynamics acted to ultimately construct the AG’s clear 
statement that military action was lawful.8  In doing so, the article yields two new insights.  
First, it undermines the liberal-constitutional fiction of the singular, autonomous legal author 
of a definitive, independent legal text.  This reifying fiction was simultaneously undermined 
and exploited by Number 10 to manage the wider political climate of scepticism and 
uncertainty in the lead-up to military action.  Second, this article demonstrates how the AG’s 
‘u-turn’ represents a salient ‘case study’ supporting Foucault’s thesis that power and 
knowledge are reciprocal: 
 
“The exercise of power perpetually creates knowledge and, 
conversely, knowledge constantly induces effects of power.”9 
 
                                                          
by the security council of Iraq’s failures, but not an express decision to authorise force’.  Hansard (n 
3) para 9. 
6 Vaughan Lowe, ‘The Iraq Crisis: What now? (2003) 52(4) ICLQ 859, 865-869; Lord Steyn, ‘The 
Legality of the Invasion of Iraq’ (2010) 1 E.H.R.L.R. 1-7; Rabinder Singh QC, ‘Why War is Illegal’ 
(The Times Online, 14 March 2003) <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/why-war-is-illegal-
fcm3f0ppl6c>; Ulf Bernitz et al, ‘War Would be Illegal’ (The Guardian Online, 7 March 2003) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2003/mar/07/highereducation.iraq>; Philippe Sands QC, 
Lawless World: Making & Breaking Global Rules (Penguin, 2006). 
7 John Chilcot, Official Iraq Inquiry website <http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/the-inquiry/> 
8 This investigation builds upon the author’s earlier Iraq war research which identified a recurring 
relationship between political power and control of knowledge across parliamentary and judicial 
contexts: Rebecca Moosavian, Judges & High Prerogative: The Enduring Influence of Expertise and 
Legal Purity [2012] Public Law, 724; Rebecca Moosavian, ‘Fountain of Honour’?  The Role of 
Crown in the Iraq War [2013] Kings Law Journal, Vol 24(3) 289.  See, more recently: Veronika 
Fikfak & Hayley Hooper, Parliament’s Secret War (Hart, 2018).   
9 Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge, Selected Interviews and Other Writings (Longman 1980) 52.  






Such power/knowledge dynamics arguably pervaded the Iraq affair more widely.  For example, 
its instigation of no fewer than four inquiries10 illustrates Foucault’s ‘will to truth’ schema in 
action, 11  and, indeed, the Iraq ‘project’ itself was arguably motivated by deep-rooted 
Orientalist tendencies.12  As such, the Iraq war – but the AG’s legal ‘u-turn’ in particular – 
offers an ideal case study in which to investigate ‘the politics of truth’.13 
 
This article identifies and analyses four power/knowledge dynamics that acted to ultimately 
produce the AG’s clear statement that military action was internationally lawful.  As Parts 1-
4 demonstrate, Lord Goldsmith was at the very least subjected to subtle, covert, yet highly 
effective power/knowledge-based techniques that played a significant role in managing him 
and his legal advice.  The first dynamic, ‘the politics of writing’, concerned highly revealing 
evasions regarding bureaucratic record-taking which acted to limit what key actors (and later, 
the inquiry) could know about Iraq-era events.  The second dynamic concerned the ‘fostering 
of knowledge asymmetries’ by systematically withholding information and/or excluding 
individuals from groups or discussions.  This minimised opportunities for dissent and/or 
resistance, affording crucial power-based advantages for Number 10.  Third, the dynamic of 
‘tailoring the knowledge context’ entailed the provision of highly partisan background 
knowledge as a form of influence; this had a direct effect in producing the ‘green light’ text 
in Lord Goldsmith’s name.  The fourth dynamic, ‘trading on expertise’, involved exploiting 
an apparently unequivocal and authoritative text by Lord Goldsmith, the lead government 
                                                          
10 See also: Lord Hutton, Report of the Inquiry into the Circumstances Surrounding the Death of Dr. 
David Kelly C.M.G., (January 2004, HC 247);  Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors (chair: 
Lord Butler), Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction, (July 2004, HC 898); Report 
of the Baha Mousa Inquiry (chair: Sir William Gage) Vol 1 (September 2011, HC1452-I). 
11 Michel Foucault, The Discourse on Language, in The Archaeology of Knowledge & the Discourse of 
Language (Pantheon, 1972) 218-220.  This relentless drive, even compulsion, for ‘the truth’ informs 
the very nature of inquires such as Chilcot’s. In this context the inquiry represents a ‘truth 
mechanism’ acting to re-assert the ‘the facts’, albeit one that is an expression of state power: Foucault, 
Power (n 9) 32-52; Foucault Power/Knowledge (n 9) 93. 
12 In a leading example of power/knowledge critique, Said applied Foucauldian analysis to illustrate the 
power/knowledge dynamics inherent in European constructions of the Middle East.  Edward Said, 
Orientalism (Penguin 2003).   





lawyer, for significant political advantage on a highly divisive issue.  These four 
power/knowledge dynamics, examined in turn in Parts 1-4, were directly implicated in 
Chilcot’s conclusions that the ‘circumstances in which it was ultimately decided that there 
was a legal basis for UK participation [in Iraq] were far from satisfactory.’14  As Part 5 argues, 
these engrained power/knowledge inequalities continue to exert an influence in post-Iraq 
military action decisions, posing ongoing challenges to the maintenance of meaningful checks 
and balances on matters of warfare.  
 
[1] The Politics of Writing: Fixation & Evasion 
 
Tony Blair’s preference for ‘bi-laterals’, private one-to-one meetings with ministers,15 and for 
tight-knit, informal group decision-making outside of Cabinet is viewed as a key feature of 
his premiership.16  This tendency towards greater informality within Cabinet was confirmed 
by the Butler Report,17 and related lapses in Blair-era record keeping have also been noted. 18  
In the Iraq affair, this lack of minuting was related to the fact that many decisions were taken 
outside formal Cabinet mechanisms.  Though record-keeping may appear to be a process-
driven concern of bureaucrats, the Iraq affair reveals it to be a contested and politically 
significant activity.  Conventions governing the recording of Cabinet minutes confirmed that 
‘the first purpose of a minute was to set out the conclusions reached so that those who have 
to take action know precisely what to do’.19   
                                                          
14 Chilcot Report (n 2) vol 6(7) [384]. See also: House of Commons Liaison Committee, Oral Evidence: 
Follow up to the Chilcot Report, HC 689 (2 Nov 2016) Q72, Q77. 
15 Christopher Foster, ‘Cabinet Government in the Twentieth Century’, MLR (2004) 67(5) 753-771, 
768-9; David Blunkett, The Blunkett Tapes, My Life in the Bear Pit (Bloomsbury, London, 2006) 11.  
16 Anthony Seldon, Blair (Free Press, London, 2005) 695-6.  Ministers also indicate that Cabinet was 
not seen by Blair as a decision-making forum: Clare Short, An Honourable Deception? New Labour, 
Iraq, and the Misuse of Power (Free Press, London, 2005) 70; Robin Cook, The Point of Departure, 
Diaries from the Front Bench (Pocket Books, London, 2004) 115. 
17 Butler Report (n 10).     
18 Deficiencies in the Blair government’s record-keeping pre-dated the Iraq affair: Foster (n 15) 765-6, 
769; Blunkett (n 15) 22-3; Cook (n 16) 138.   






Chilcot identified numerous discussions on crucial Iraq-related matters between 2001-2003 
that occurred outside of Cabinet and went unrecorded.  For example, Blair held regular 
telephone discussions about Iraq over weekends that were not routinely minuted.20  The report 
identified other fundamental lapses in recording, with no official record of discussion taken in 
nine important meetings about crucial aspects of developing Iraq policy, and one where no 
clear conclusions were recorded. 21   Six of these unrecorded discussions involved Lord 
Goldsmith’s legal advice.22  Additionally, Chilcot noted persistent minuting failures regarding 
Iraq-related meetings of the COBR(R) committee throughout this period.23  
 
[1.1] The Politics of Writing & the AG’s Advice 
 
Despite these tendencies against recording, many ministerial actions were indeed captured.  
Additionally, vital struggles between senior ministers and Lord Goldsmith (and other lawyers) 
occurred around the apparatus of writing.  Writing occupies an important role in Foucault’s 
understanding of power/knowledge.  Combined with disciplinary techniques of observation 
and examination it enables the production of a body of knowledge about the observed 
individual.24  Foucault claimed that the act of writing is  
 
‘a power that insidiously objectifies those on whom it is applied; to 
form a body of knowledge about these individuals’.25   
                                                          
20 Though a weekly note was provided to Blair’s inner circle.  Alastair Campbell, Oral evidence to Iraq 
Inquiry (12 January 2010) 9-12,  <http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/95142/2010-01-12-
Transcript-Campbell-S1-am.pdf>.  See also: Jonathan Powell, Oral Evidence (18 January 2010) 7-
10,  <http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/95166/2010-01-18-Transcript-Powell-S1.pdf>. 
21 These unrecorded meetings were, in chronological order: (1) 30 January 2002; Chilcot Report (n 2) 
vol 3(3.6) [815]-[816], [818].  (2) 19 February 2002; vol 1(3.2) [62]-[64].  (3) 2 April 2002; vol 1(3.2) 
[533], [535].  (4) 23 July 2002; vol 2(3.3) [337]-[340], [342], [361].  (5) 14 October 2002; vol 2(3.4) 
[481]-[488].  (6) 7 November 2002; vol 2(3.5) [803]-[809], [811].  (7) 19 December 2002; vol 5(5) 
[153].  (8) 27 February 2003; vol 5(5) [451]-[453], [463].  (9) 11 March 2003; vol 5(5) [589]-[599].  
(10) 12 March 2003; vol 3(3.8) [269]-[273].     
22 Meetings (4)-(9) listed above (n 21). 
23 Chilcot Report (n 2) vol 1(2) [211]-[212], [217]-[219]. 
24 Michel Foucault, Discipline & Punish, The Birth of the Prison (London: Penguin,1991). 189, ch 4.1. 






Writing enables the recording or fixing of information about the individual, and the 
communication and accumulation of such knowledge, thus amounting to an exercise of power 
over them.26   
 
The documents obtained by the inquiry captured information about individual political actors 
as they undertook their functions, revealing various stand-offs between lawyers and ministers 
from March 2002.  For example, Sir Michael Wood, Head FCO Lawyer who consistently 
viewed military action in Iraq as internationally unlawful, wrote to senior colleagues 
expressing concerns and reiterating his advice on four separate occasions in 2002.27  He also 
wrote to Jack Straw three times in similar terms;28 the final exchange, in January 2003, 
resulted in the AG’s ‘timely and justified’ intervention on Wood’s behalf. 29   
 
Select incidents involving Lord Goldsmith and the politics of writing over this period are of 
particular significance.  Records indicate that the AG was repeatedly, expressly deterred from 
providing his written advice on the legal position.  For example, the AG sent a minute 
confirming his legal advice on 30th July 2002,30  stating ‘I didn’t want there to be any doubt 
that, in my view, the Prime Minister could not have the view that he could agree with Bush’ 
to undertake military action without going to UN.31   Due to concerns about leaks, Number 10 
asked for this minute to have a highly restricted circulation and, later, for the few existing 
copies to be destroyed with the AG’s agreement.32  The AG conceded ‘I don’t, frankly, think 
                                                          
26 The fixation provided by the apparatus of writing opens up the possibility of ‘the constitution of the 
individual as a describable, analysable object’.  ibid 189-90.  See also: Tom Keenan, ‘The ‘Paradox’ 
of Knowledge and Power: Reading Foucault on a Bias’ (1987) Political Theory Vol 15(1), 5-37, 13; 
Gary Gutting, French Philosophy in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge 2001) 281. 
27 Chilcot Report (n 2) vol 2(3.3) [85]-[86]; vol 2(3.4) [123]-[127]; vol 2(3.5) [594]-[597],[613]-[617]. 
28 ibid vol 1(3.2) [482]-[487]; vol 2(3.4) [225]-[230].  See also: (n 29) below. 
29 ibid vol 5(5) [341]-[357], [359]-[366], [373]-[377], [382]. 
30 Iraq Inquiry, Declassified Documents, Attorney General Minute to Prime Minister (30 July 2002). 
31  Lord Goldsmith, Oral evidence to Iraq Inquiry (27 January 2010) 23, 
<http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/235686/2010-01-27-Transcript-Goldsmith-s1.pdf>   





it [the advice] was terribly welcome.’33   
 
The AG was expressly asked to not provide written advice on four further occasions: in 
October 2002, twice in December 2002 34  and January 2003.  The October and January 
incidents are particularly interesting because the AG defied such instructions.  In October, 
during the negotiations for UNSCR 1441, Lord Goldsmith expressed concerns in a telephone 
conversation with Straw, reminding him that the draft resolution as it stood did not authorise 
force.35  Goldsmith stressed his wish ‘to ensure that his advice was clearly on the record’,36 
but Straw persuaded him to wait and speak to the Prime Minister first.  Following the 
subsequent meeting with Blair, the AG sent a letter reiterating his legal view.37     This 
prompted a phone call to the AG from Jonathan Powell, Blair’s Chief of Staff.  Powell’s 
(declassified) handwritten note of the conversation states:  
 
‘I spoke to the AG to make it clear we do not expect records of 
meetings from other departments, especially from people not even 
at the meeting.  We produce records should they be needed.’38 
 
                                                          
33 Goldsmith transcript (n 31) 24.  Blair denied that it was unwelcome: Tony Blair, Oral evidence to 
Iraq Inquiry (29 January 2010) 147-148, 232 <http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/229766/2010-
01-29-transcript-blair-s1.pdf > 
34 Iraq Inquiry, Declassified Documents, Letter from Michael Wood to Catherine Adams (9 December 
2002) para 3; Iraq Inquiry, Declassified Documents, David Brummell minute of meeting at No 10 
(19 December 2002) para 10(c); Sir Michael Wood, witness statement to Iraq Inquiry (15 March 
2011) 19-20 <http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/96182/2011-03-15-Statement-Wood-3.pdf>; 
Lord Goldsmith, Witness statement to Iraq Inquiry (4 January 2011) [2.3] 
<http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/96134/2011-01-04-Statement-Goldsmith.pdf> [1.12], [4.2]; 
Chilcot Report (n 2) vol 3(3.6) [241]-[242]; vol 5(5) [97], [99], [142].  
35 There is striking variation in the way the AG-Straw telephone conversation was recorded by the AGO 
and the briefer, sanitised FCO minute: Iraq Inquiry, Declassified Documents, AGO note of the 
Goldsmith-Straw telecom (21 October 2002); Iraq Inquiry, Declassified Documents, FCO note of 
Goldsmith-Straw telecom (18 October 2002).  See also: Chilcot Report (n 2) vol 2(3.5) [462]-[463], 
[469]-[470], [630]-[633], [636]; Goldsmith witness statement (n 34) [2.3]. 
36 Chilcot Report (n 2) vol 2(3.4) [623]-[624], [638]-[640]. See also: Iraq Inquiry, Declassified AGO 
note of the Goldsmith-Straw telecom (n 35); Goldsmith witness statement (n 34) [2.7]-[2.8]. 
37  Chilcot Report (n 2) vol 2(3.4) [658]-[659], [667]-[671].  See also: Iraq Inquiry, Declassified 
Documents, David Brummell letter to Sir David Manning (23 October 2002).  
38  Emphasis added.  Chilcot Report (n 2) vol 2(3.4) [672].  See also: Iraq Inquiry, Declassified 





The AG later wrote of this event, ‘if I had not recorded my advice through the means of the 
letter …  I would have ensured the same result was achieved by other means’.39  This telling 
incident is a clear indication that Goldsmith and Powell fully appreciated the political 
significance of recording events as a part of the exercise and engendering of power.  Indeed 
the AG claims that following this incident, he was no longer actively consulted in the UNSCR 
negotiations and was ‘discouraged’ from providing advice.40   
 
On 14th January 2003 the AG provided a 6-page draft advice to the Prime Minister.41  It 
confirmed that, as matters stood, military action was not authorised by UNSCR 1441.42  Just 
two weeks later, on 30 January, the AG provided written advice for a second time despite 
being explicitly told by Number 10 not to do so.43  This letter reiterated the negative view 
expressed in the AG’s draft advice.44  A handwritten comment on this letter by Blair’s Private 
Secretary, Matthew Rycroft, reads: 
 
‘Tony.  I specifically said we did not need further advice this week.  
Matthew’ 
 
A further comment by Blair reads: 
 
‘I just don’t understand this.’45 
 
These comments indicate that this advice was unwelcome, particularly in light of a planned 
meeting with President Bush at the White House the following day (31st January).  The AG 
                                                          
39 Emphasis added.  Goldsmith witness statement (n 34) [3.3]-[3.5], [3.8].  See also: Chilcot Report (n 
2) vol 2(3.5) [982]. 
40 Goldsmith witness statement (n 34) [1.3], [4.2].  See also a further incident on 11 November 2002:  
Chilcot Report (n 2) vol 5(5) [5]-[6] [8]-[11]; Iraq Inquiry, Declassified Documents, AGO note of 
Goldsmith/Powell telecom (11 November 2002) para 2-3. 
41 Iraq Inquiry, Declassified Documents, Lord Goldsmith minute (draft advice) to Prime Minister (14 
January 2003); Chilcot Report (n 2) vol 5(5) [166]. 
42 Chilcot Report (n 2) vol 3(3.6) [515]-[517]; vol 5(5) [167]-[170], [184], [190], [194]. 
43 ibid vol 3(3.6) [860]-[861]; vol 5(5) [285]-[286], [289]-[290]. 
44 Iraq Inquiry, Declassified Documents, Goldsmith minute to Prime Minister (30 January 2003); ibid 
vol 5(5) [293]-[296]. 





claimed he wrote this later letter to confirm his position remained unchanged in advance of 
that meeting.46   
 
The political implications of the act of recording were later acknowledged by Chilcot, who 
claimed one broad lesson from his report was that it is ‘vital for serious decisions and the 
reasons behind them to be recorded in the public archive’.47  Yet this part demonstrates that 
the apparatus of writing was a site of vital struggles, and the 2002 to January 2003 period 
witnessed highly significant instances of ministerial attempts to evade recording, particularly 
with regard to the AG’s provision of legal advice.  The repeated efforts to deter the AG from 
advising, and irritation at the lawyerly tendency to fix events or positions in writing indicate 
that actors had an acute awareness of the political significance of recording as a potential 
power over them; one that was to be avoided if possible.  Once such records exist they can 
provide material that enables political actors to be later subjected to the hierarchical 
observation and examination of the inquiry.  The AG as lawyer wanted advice, discussions 
and meetings set out in writing.  Such records provided a source of protection and a form of 
leverage or power, even though they purportedly had no formal or technical legal effect at that 
stage.48   
 
Blair’s premiership style, which actively impeded official record-taking, held strategic power 
advantages that became pertinent in the lead-up to the Iraq war.  Sustained deficiencies in the 
minuting of discussions acted to impoverish knowledge of Iraq-era activities in two ways.  
First, at the time it resulted in a dearth of records that could inform key actors, including 
Cabinet ministers, of what was discussed or decided.  Second, the significant amount of 
activity occurring ‘off-record’ placed it beyond the reach of the later Chilcot Inquiry, a forum 
                                                          
46 Goldsmith transcript (n 31) 90; Chilcot Report (n 2) vol 5(5) [300]. 
47 House of Commons Liaison Committee (n 14) Q40, Q50, Q104. 
48  Tony Blair, Oral evidence to the Iraq Inquiry (21 January 2011) 65-69  
<http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/230337/2011-01-21-Transcript-Blair-S1.pdf>; Chilcot 





that inevitably entailed the exclusion of what was not recorded, or not said from the officially 
sanctioned, definitive ‘true’ narrative of the final Report.  Quod non est in actis non est in 
mundo.49  But there were also limits to the extent individuals were able to elude writing as a 
mode of domination, and many actions were nevertheless recorded to be later offered up to 
the gaze of the inquiry.  Paradoxically, repeated instructions to the AG not to set out his views 
or advice in writing were themselves captured in writing, raising the question of whether some 
form of fixation was inescapable.   
 
 
[2] Fostering Knowledge Asymmetries 
 
A second practice linked to Blair’s preference for informal, bi-lateral decision-making outside 
Cabinet was the highly selective sharing and management of knowledge.  A fostering of 
knowledge asymmetries occurred via two related methods: first, the limited provision of 
papers or crucial information to Cabinet ministers, and second, excluding individuals from 
certain groups or discussions where knowledge was shared or produced.  Both practices were 
highly Foucauldian in their use of apparently minor, detailed techniques at an individual, 
localised level (albeit within the state),50 and their subtle, productive effect, which limited 
what key actors, including Lord Goldsmith, knew about certain crucial issues. 
 
                                                          
49 What is not kept in records does not exist.  For further discussion see: Cornelia Vismann, Files, Law 
& Media Technology (Stanford University Press, 2008); Michael Lynch & David Bogen, The 
Spectacle of History, Speech Text & Memory at the Iran-contra Hearings (Duke University Press, 
1996), ch 2-3.   
50 Foucault’s focus was on hidden power-relations at particular ground-level contexts (e.g. prisons).  
Yet despite his call to ‘cut off the king’s head’ in political theory, he did not deny the importance of 
state power.  For Foucault, power circulates everywhere, so localised practices and resistances do 
not only occur at the ‘extremities’ but also across state institutions at all levels.  Foucault, 
Power/Knowledge (n 9) 96-99, 102, 139-41; Foucault, Power (n 9) 60, 117, 122-123, 324; Michel 





As with issues of minuting, lapses in the circulation of advance papers to Cabinet was a noted 
feature of Blair’s premiership. 51   In Chilcot evidence two Iraq-era Cabinet Secretaries 
suggested that practices of information-control and exclusion were an integral characteristic 
of the Blair government, and the Iraq era represented business as usual rather than an 
aberration.  Lord Wilson claimed that the Blair government was concerned to avoid the 
problems of divided Labour governments of the 1970s, ‘So control over the meeting and who 
is there and who writes the minutes matters.’52  Wilson’s successor, Lord Turnbull suggested 
‘this is not a bad habit they slip into.  This was, in a sense, the [New Labour] operating 
manual.’53  
 
Chilcot provided a substantial body of evidence that in the lead up to military action failures 
in information-sharing and practices of exclusion were pervasive.  Various witnesses claimed 
that important information was not shared with key actors, particularly Cabinet Ministers.54  
For example, a crucial March 2002 paper setting out various options for dealing with Iraq was 
not shared with or discussed by Cabinet, despite the fact that it was created to help ministers 
decide policy.55  On three further occasions in mid-2002 Blair did not disclose to Cabinet 
claims he had made to the US regarding UK military assistance.56  Later, in September, 
Cabinet was not informed of (or invited to discuss) the ongoing challenges in agreeing the text 
                                                          
51 Butler Report (n 10) [609]-[611].  Peter Hennessy, The Prime Minister, The Office and its Holders 
Since 1945 (Penguin, London, 2001) 481-2.  
52  Emphasis added.  Lord Wilson, Oral evidence to Iraq Inquiry (25 January 2011) 87 
<http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/95446/2011-01-25-Transcript-Wilson-S1.pdf>.   
53 Author’s addition.  Lord Turnbull, Oral evidence to Iraq Inquiry (25 January 2011) 10-12, 36-7 
<http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/234680/2011-01-25-transcript-turnbull-s2.pdf>.  
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of UNSCR 1441.57  Further instances of information management in relation to Cabinet in 
January58 and March59 2003 became more striking, and their implications more acute. 
 
The inquiry revealed that the second practice of bi-lateral meetings and selective exclusions 
was also prevalent in the lead-up to war.  Such tendencies led to the exclusion of outspoken 
minister Clare Short,60 but also, on occasion, key ministers such as Straw and Hoon.61  Lord 
Turnbull explained that Cabinet structures were bypassed and decisions were made in other 
ways: 
 
‘How many serious arguments did they have in Cabinet?  The 
answer … is very few. … [T]he arguments took place elsewhere. … 
[Decisions did not really get made in an] overt … face-to-face 
[way]’62 
 
Chilcot confirmed that Blair made most pre-deployment decisions either bi-laterally or with 
Straw, Hoon, Number 10 aides, select senior defence and intelligence staff; Cabinet played a 
very limited role in the substantive discussion, analysis and development of Iraq policy.63   
 
These two related strategies - information control and exclusion - had a specific effect in 
relation to the AG’s advice.  Between 2002 and 2003 he was marginalised during the UNSCR 
1441 negotiations and not included in Cabinet.  As this part demonstrates, vital knowledge 
(and power) asymmetries benefitting Number 10 resulted. 
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[2.1] The AG’s Marginalisation from UNSCR Negotiations 
 
A significant instance of the AG’s marginalisation was during the UNSCR 1441 negotiating 
process in September to October 2002.  As early as March 2002 Lord Goldsmith had asked to 
be included in developing Iraq policy, suggesting that it ‘would not be helpful … if [he was] 
presented at the last moment with a request for a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer.’64  The AG made four 
further similar requests in July,65 September 66 and twice in October 2002.67  Yet though Lord 
Goldsmith was provided with updates about the ongoing negotiations and declared himself 
satisfied with these arrangements, 68  the information provided was limited.  Though he 
received general telegram updates on negotiations, he was not within the ‘restricted’ group 
that got all telegrams, including the most critical discussions.69  The AG later identified this 
as the first of three reasons for his limited involvement in UNSCR 1441.  The failures in 
information-sharing went both ways, and the UK’s UN negotiators were not made aware of 
the legal concerns of FCO lawyers and the AG.70   
 
In addition to receiving limited information, Lord Goldsmith was excluded from the 
discussions about the resolution-in-progress.  The AG claimed he was ‘not being sufficiently 
involved’ at ministerial level.71  In evidence he added:   
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‘I wasn’t included in meetings in a sense at all.  I don’t know what 
meetings were taking place between the Prime Minister and others.  
I was involved ... simply on my own [with my officials].72  
 
The AG’s exclusion also took the form of not being asked to provide advice on the developing 
resolution.  There was some involvement of the AG’s office in the initial stages of the draft 
resolution in early and late September.  But from this point, the AG’s advice was not sought.73  
Some subsequent drafts of the resolution in progress were copied to Goldsmith’s office for 
information, but these did not come with requests to advise, which he later admitted ‘was 
slightly unsatisfactory.’74 In testimony he explained that ‘it didn’t seem to be the practice’ for 
AGs to advise on draft resolutions, and conceded that in hindsight he could have been more 
involved in the detail. 75   The AG repeatedly expressed concerns about his level of 
involvement, leading to a discussion with Blair on 22 October.  However, Chilcot noted that 
by this time, ‘Key decisions on the resolution had already been taken and the draft was at an 
advanced stage.’76  Ultimately, the report found that during the UNSCR 1441 negotiations, 
the AG’s advice should have been sought and shared with key Ministers and officials in order 
to have an ‘agreed, collective understanding of the legal effect of the resolution’.77  
 
[2.2] The AG’s Marginalisation from Cabinet 
 
The Chilcot Report also indicated that Lord Goldsmith was marginalised from Cabinet, and 
that his views were consistently kept from senior Cabinet ministers.  Though he only attended 
Cabinet twice prior to the invasion (in January and March 2003), Lord Goldsmith denied that 
he was ever explicitly excluded, stating it simply was not the practice for the AG to attend.  
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However, he conceded that more involvement over the first half of 2002 would have been 
better.  Furthermore, he claimed   
 
‘I think, at a later stage, my view prevailed that, as Attorney 
General, I ought to be present at Cabinet so that I could hear what 
was taking place, and therefore be in a much better position to 
advise’.78 
 
This statement indicates that the AG’s involvement in Cabinet, as with the legal advice 
discussed in Part 1, was something he had to push for.  Related to this, Lord Goldsmith’s 
advice was repeatedly kept from Cabinet ministers.  For example, in a November 2002 Cabinet 
meeting Jack Straw outlined the newly passed UNSCR 1441, explaining that a key feature of 
the text was that no second resolution was needed.  Though this did not reflect the legal advice 
of the AG or the FCO,79 without access to this information ministers were unable to appraise 
such claims.  
 
The AG’s exclusion from Cabinet continued until 16th January 2003, when he attended it two 
days after providing negative draft advice.  However, oddly, his advice was not shared with 
senior ministers, who were unaware of its existence or content, a point FCO lawyer Elizabeth 
Wilmshurst deemed unusual and surprising.80  Blair did not ask the AG to speak at the meeting 
and there was no Cabinet discussion of his advice.  Chilcot claimed that as a result, ‘Cabinet 
Ministers, including those whose responsibilities were directly engaged, were not informed of 
the doubts expressed in Lord Goldsmith’s draft advice’.81  Chilcot was critical of such failures, 
claiming that Goldsmith’s advice should have at least been shared with Jack Straw, Defence 
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Secretary Geoff Hoon and the Cabinet Secretary.82  These knowledge-management tendencies 
continued into March and indeed right up to the start of military action: 
 
‘Until 7 March 2003, Mr Blair and Mr Powell asked that Lord 
Goldsmith’s [legal] views … should be tightly held and not shared 
with Ministerial colleagues without No 10’s permission.’83 
 
The second technique of fostering knowledge asymmetries contributed to the construction of 
the AG’s ‘green light’ statement.  Number 10 cultivated these asymmetries by tightly 
controlling the circulation of information and/or excluding individuals, including the AG, 
from meetings or groups where knowledge was shared or produced.  These seemingly 
anonymous Foucauldian techniques were far more effective than issuing commands or 
orders.84  They exerted a subtle influence on political actors by managing who was able to 
know what, discreetly impoverishing the knowledge context in which they operated.  The 
tendency towards bi-laterals and exclusion was particularly advantageous to the inner circle 
who enjoyed crucial informational advantages as a result.  Knowledge asymmetries translated 
into power asymmetries vis-à-vis individual ministers, enabling conflict to be effectively 
managed.  Lord Turnbull astutely observed that such practices enabled a higher degree of 
control over the outcome of meetings.  Speaking of the informal groups that Blair used, 
Turnbull noted,    
 
‘you choose who you want to be there.  You have greater control 
over the papers that go through and greater control over the 
membership and thereby you control the degree of challenge.85  
 
Foucault’s account of power entails possibilities for individual resistance.86  But though there 
remained possibilities for resistance - as the actions of Goldsmith, Short and those who later 
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resigned demonstrated - such resistance was more difficult without the information to 
effectively understand and question policy.  Furthermore, individual resistance was more 
easily dissipated bi-laterally than in a collective forum where doubts could be articulated and 
shared.  The conduct of the Iraq-era Cabinet thus demonstrates how simple and apparently 
minor adjustments to chairmanship practices can take effect on individuals to subtly engender 
compliance or passivity, with - as Part 4.1 also shows - significant and wide-ranging effects 
upon decisions of war. 
 
 
[3] Tailoring the Knowledge Context: The U-Turn  
 
In the weeks between early February and 13th March 2003 the AG changed his legal advice to 
confirm that military action in Iraq would be lawful in the absence of a second UNSC 
resolution.  This u-turn took two broad stages, during which the power/knowledge dynamics 
discussed in Parts 1-2 continued to operate.  But a third dynamic played a central role here; 
the provision of highly partisan background information acted to shape the knowledge context 
in which the AG produced his legal opinion. 
 
[3.1] Phase One: Qualified Advice & the ‘Amber Light’  
 
Discernible shifts in Lord Goldsmith’s legal view were recorded on 1287 and 27 February88 
2003.  But on 7th March the AG finally provided formal written advice to the Prime Minister 
upon request.  This lengthy, complex advice provided qualified approval of military action in 
the absence of a second resolution.  It confirmed that ‘the language of resolution 1441 leaves 
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the position unclear and … Arguments can be made on both sides’,  but that a reasonable case 
for the ‘revival’ of UNSCR 67889 could be made.  However, ‘hard evidence of [Iraqi] non-
compliance’ with weapons inspections was needed, and Goldsmith cautioned that ‘you will 
need to consider extremely carefully whether the evidence … is sufficiently compelling’.90  The 
Attorney General later claimed that this view was the ‘green light’ for military action,91 but 
its cautious and heavily caveated position is more akin to amber or amber/green.  In any event, 
this advice was only shared with Hoon, Straw, John Reid (Minister without Portfolio) and the 
Chiefs of Staff.92  Four related forms of highly partisan background knowledge led to the AG’s 
change of view.   
 
First, the AG was finally provided with extensive material regarding the negotiating history 
of UNSCR 1441 along with his formal instructions on 9th December.93  The AG maintained 
that he needed this supporting documentation to provide a definitive legal view  and worked 
through this material over the course of January 2003.94  The AG claimed that Jack Straw was 
‘anxious’ that he should have a full understanding of the negotiating history and Goldsmith 
asked to be briefed on this so he could form a ‘definitive’ legal view.95  The FCO put together 
extensive telegrams from the negotiations for the AG, and upon later questioning Straw 
assumed this would have included records documenting disagreements with the French about 
the meaning of UNSCR 1441. 96   Yet there were problematic gaps in this material; no 
documents corroborated the UK/US allegations that the French had privately recognised that 
there was no need for a second resolution.  The AG acknowledged that he had to take the word 
of US negotiators on this point.97  
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A second factor influencing the AG’s shift was his meeting with UNSCR 1441’s principal UK 
UN negotiator, Sir Jeremy Greenstock, on 23rd January.98  The AG explained that the meeting 
was to obtain Greenstock’s views, though he felt no obligation to comply with them.99  This 
was followed by a letter from the AG’s office to Number 10 which confirmed that the AG’s 
view had not changed.100   In evidence the AG claimed that Greenstock ‘made some good 
points and he had made some headway with me, but, frankly, there was still some work for me 
to do and he hadn’t got me there, if you like, yet.101   
 
A third influence was a detailed letter from Straw to the AG in early February 2003. 102  
Elsewhere Straw had emphasised his intense knowledge of UNSCR 1441’s negotiating 
history,103 and he stressed this at the start of his letter:   
 
‘I would be very grateful if you would carefully consider my 
comments below before coming to a final conclusion …  As you will 
be aware, I was immersed in the line-by-line negotiations of the 
Resolution, much of which was conducted capital to capital with P5 
Foreign Ministers.’ 104 
 
This represents a further example of Straw emphasising his superior knowledge of the 
negotiating background of UNSCR 1441, and using it to imply his greater insight into the 
UK’s legal position than the lawyers.105 
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The fourth factor leading to the ‘amber/green’ advice was the AG’s trip to Washington D.C. 
to speak to American UNSC negotiators on 10th February.106  According to the AG, this option 
had arisen in discussions with Powell and Greenstock, and he welcomed the prospect, thinking 
it would be helpful.  The AG claimed the US actors spoke with ‘absolutely one voice’ on the 
issue of whether a second resolution was needed; they were very clear that they had not 
conceded the US ‘red line’, the right to undertake military action without a further 
resolution.107 
 
The AG’s first crucial shift, articulated in his ‘amber/green’ 7th March advice, was a product 
of power/knowledge dynamics.  Though there exists no recorded evidence of direct 
pressure,108 select ‘inner circle’ actors closely allied to Number 10 exercised a high degree of 
control over the crucial informational context in which the AG produced his advice in two 
related ways.  First, in the course of work they necessarily ‘produced’ the additional material 
outlined in this part.  Foucault viewed knowledge as man-made and generated by power 
relations, contradicting the Enlightenment-based view that pre-existing objective truths await 
discovery. For Foucault ‘truth isn’t outside power’ but ‘is a thing of this world’.109  The 
collective ‘man-made’ information regarding UNSCR 1441 - the telegrams, letters and views 
of Straw, Greenwood and the Americans - constituted a knowledge which is routinely 
generated in the course of exercising power (e.g. diplomacy, the conduct of state foreign 
affairs). 110   Yet, such knowledge was inherently partisan because, as Chilcot fleetingly 
acknowledged, such records will inevitably reflect the perspectives of their authors and the 
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wider culture in which they operate.111  Second, the ‘inner circle’ exercised discretion over the 
particular selection of material to be provided to the AG, and the timing of its disclosure; this 
was a carefully curated and timed provision of knowledge.  For example, why were only the 
US/UK views of background negotiations deemed relevant to the AG’s advice?112  And if the 
background knowledge of UNSCR 1441 negotiations was so fundamental to forming the legal 
advice, why was the AG not privy to such information at the time?  Blair conceded in 
testimony that Goldsmith should have been involved in UNSC resolution negotiations much 
sooner.113  Yet other witnesses, such as Short114 and Lord Turnbull,115 see this as an effective 
strategy rather than a misjudgement or oversight.  Cumulatively, these matters created a 
situation in which the AG’s knowledge of background material regarding UNSCR 1441 was 
limited, and his standing vis-à-vis Number 10 was thus diminished to a relationship of 
dependency.   
 
These knowledge-based advantages engendered power in that they directly influenced the 
AG’s change of advice to support the Prime Minister’s preferred outcome.  However, this shift 
occurred ‘outside’ of the legal text, via the weighting process that AG undertook in the process 
of constructing his advice.  The most significant factor informing Lord Goldsmith’s shift was 
his acceptance that affording significant weight to the knowledge of private negotiating 
background was necessary to provide a proper legal interpretation.  Yet the AG nevertheless 
conceded that its evidential status would be ‘very uncertain’.116  Additionally, this approach 
directly contradicted Goldsmith’s earlier January draft advice which attached negligible 
weight to background negotiations, 117  as well as Wood’s December instructions which 
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cautioned upon the reliance of such material.118  Ultimately, the 7th March advice was a direct 
consequence of highly significant yet unarticulated decisions taken outside of, and prior to, 
that text.  The crucial pre-interpretive choices included, for example: whether negotiating 
background was relevant; if so, the weighting of such material; and which UNSC members’ 
views should be considered.  These decisions determined the substantive content of the advice, 
yet were strongly influenced by actors who asserted their superior knowledge of this 
negotiating background and the AG’s relative lack of it119 (until, of course, they chose to 
supply him with it).  This led the AG’s view to change from its previous ‘red light’ position, 
thus highlighting the productive nature of power – its ability to construct (legal) knowledge 
by working through individuals, stimulating them to do things.120  The operation of this 
productive, knowledge-forming power continued in phase two of Lord Goldsmith’s u-turn.   
 
[3.2] Phase Two: The ‘Green Light’ Clear Statement  
 
On 17th March 2003 the AG published a brief, conclusive statement of his advice to Cabinet 
and Parliament.  It decisively asserted that military action in Iraq was authorised by 
international law, and the caveats of his 7th March advice, drafted just 10 days earlier, were 
absent.  One factor was crucial in this second fundamental phase of the AG’s u-turn: the needs 
of the UK military and civil service.  Without a clear statement that military action was lawful 
troops would be potentially liable for crimes in international law, and therefore they could not 
be engaged without this. 
 
A 5th March letter from the Ministry of Defence (MoD) to Cabinet Secretary Lord Turnbull 
stressed that Chief of Defence Staff, Lord Michael Boyce, required clear, explicit legal 
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authorisation and that a ministerial meeting with the AG’s engagement was needed.121  On 
11th March a meeting was held at Number 10 with Lord Goldsmith, the Prime Minister, Deputy 
Prime Minister John Prescott, Hoon and Boyce.  Boyce claimed that he needed a short, clear 
paragraph from the AG confirming the lawfulness of the action.122  In evidence the AG stated 
that this was the major factor leading to his decisive view.123  But the need for the protection 
of a decisive legal statement extended beyond the military to the wider civil service and 
ministers; the very funding of war relied upon it.124  The AG’s legal view undertook a further 
shift in response.  His 7th March text had advised according to the standard used on previous 
occasions, 125 namely that a ‘reasonable case’ on the lawfulness of military action could be 
made.  But, he claimed, 
 
‘I quickly saw that actually this [reasonable case approach] wasn’t 
satisfactory from their point of view.  They deserved more, our 
troops deserved more, our civil servants who might be on the line 
deserved more, than my saying there was a reasonable case.  So, 
therefore, it was important for me to come down clearly on one side 
... or the other, which is what I proceeded to do.’126 
 
The AG claimed that, in hindsight, the reasonable case approach had been overly cautious and 
the ‘better view’ now was that military action was lawful.127  On the 13th March the AG 
confirmed to his official, David Brummell, that he had come to a clear view that military 
action was lawful and the latter made a note of this development, though not the reasons for 
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it.128  Lord Goldsmith outlined this conclusive view in various meetings that day, including 
one with Jack Straw.129  The AG’s view was confirmed in a letter sent to the MoD the next 
day that briefly and categorically asserted that military action in Iraq was authorised by 
international law.130   
 
Lord Goldsmith denied that his clear statement entailed strengthening the legal position in 
response to political expediency despite the absence of any significant international or legal 
developments that might have justified such a change.  Instead, he claimed, in this second 
phase he was simply asked to answer a different question: 
 
‘I regard … [‘is military action lawful?’] as a different question and 
you then have to … answer it [one way or the other]’131  
 
But the AG’s assertion that he was merely answering a different question supports rather than 
counters the claim that he did not ‘firm up’ his advice; the two are not mutually exclusive.  
Declaring military action lawful per se entails a higher standard than claiming there is a 
reasonable case for it.  The ‘new’ question framed the issues in a different way and entailed a 
high-stakes binary choice; either a clear ‘yes’ or ‘no’ was needed.  Answering the new 
question that set out a higher standard in the affirmative inevitably resulted in a text that was, 
on the face of it, stronger.  Firming up the legal view, or rather its appearance, was both a 
direct reason for and a direct result of asking this new, different question. In the process, 
ambiguities and subtleties in Goldsmith’s earlier advice were effaced.   
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As with the first phase of Lord Goldsmith’s shift discussed at Part 3.1, this second shift was 
directly instigated by ‘man-made’ knowledge – the need for a clear statement – which was 
generated, but not provided to the AG until a highly strategically-timed late stage.132  In 
evidence the AG conceded 
 
‘I would have liked to have known [earlier] … that what the armed 
services and Civil Service expect was not what had been by 
precedent given in the past, that they wanted more, they wanted an 
unequivocal answer.  Had I known that, then I would have 
approached the question differently’.133 
 
Yet Boyce later claimed that he had raised his need for ‘black and white legal advice’ with 
Blair in January 2003.134  This phase shows yet again how carefully managed advantages 
regarding access to and production of knowledge engendered power advantages over an AG 
who apparently did not know this crucial information.  This ultimately facilitated, in turn, the 
production of the clear legal statement military action hinged upon. 
 
‘Inner circle’ knowledge played another crucial role in the AG’s firmed up statement.  This 
concrete statement entailed the difficulty of who was to determine that Iraq was in ‘material 
breach’ of UNSCR 1441.  The AG’s previous advice in November 2002135 and January 
2003136 stated that this issue must be assessed by the UNSC.  In the absence of such an 
assessment the AG’s legal position necessitated reliance on the judgment of the Prime 
Minister137 and Number 10 accordingly confirmed ‘the Prime Minister’s unequivocal view 
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that Iraq is in further material breach of its obligations’.138  Chilcot deemed this statement 
‘perfunctory’ and was highly critical on three grounds; first, the matter had not been 
considered by senior ministers; second, Blair’s view was not informed by advice on the 
evidence; and third, the specific grounds for Blair’s view were ‘unclear’139   
 
Despite the AG’s denial, this interpretation entailed the ‘client’ confirming his own facts.140  
It silently excluded the complex, nuanced United Nations Monitoring, Verification and 
Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) reports, authoritative knowledge produced by the UN, 
as well as alternative interpretations of those facts.  And it correspondingly elevated Blair’s 
categorical statement of fact – his view, his claimed knowledge, his word - to a legally central 
position.  It effectively substituted the Prime Minister’s singular, cursory, uncorroborated 
determination for that of the UNSC; in this way his ‘perfunctory’ and highly contested factual 
view – knowledge  - was afforded a status, a power arguably beyond that which the accepted 
rules of international legal discourse allowed.  Yet this formed an essential keystone in the 
clear legal statement that was essential for the war power to be exercised and military action 
to commence.  
 
Ultimately, this part has demonstrated that when finally drafting his advice the AG was 
inundated with tactically-timed highly partisan background knowledge, particularly regarding 
UNSCR 1441 negotiations and the military need for a clear statement of law, both of which 
powerfully influenced his legal view.  This construction of the knowledge context in which 
the AG formulated his advice led to the clear statement of law published on 17th March.  Yet 
the AG’s shift depended not just on this information, but on his acceptance of highly debatable 
rules or practices of legal discourse, e.g. that select views of UNSCR 1441 background 
negotiations should be attributed great weight in his interpretation, or that ‘our troops’ desert’ 
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solely justified asking a new, more exacting legal question and answering it in the affirmative.  
These were contentious, previously unarticulated decisions over which the inner circle 
exercised a high degree influence; though taken outside the text, such decisions directly 
shaped the ‘green light’ text itself.  In this way, power created (legal) knowledge by controlling 
and framing the limits and unspoken pre-interpretive decisions by which that knowledge was 
created.  Yet this control over the conditions in which the text was produced effectively led to 
the same outcome as control over the content itself as it facilitated the production of legal 




[4] Trading on Expertise: Presenting the ‘Green Light’ 
 
At the final stage of disseminating the AG’s clear legal statement to Cabinet, Parliament and 
the wider public, a fourth power/knowledge dynamic was operative; that of trading upon 
expertise and ‘orthodoxy of source’ to enhance presentation of the clear statement that military 
action was internationally lawful.  Once the Lord Goldsmith’s clear view had been reached, 
arrangements were made to produce the text that would form the basis of the UK government’s 
position.  Over the weekend of 15-16th March 2003 the AG worked with a team of lawyers to 
draft the brief, caveat-free statement141 that was put before Cabinet and Parliament.142  
 
[4.1] Presentation to Cabinet and Parliament 
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On 17th March 2003 the AG attended Cabinet to present his conclusive statement and address 
any ministerial questions.  The meeting agreed to ask the House of Commons to approve 
military action. 143   Like the military and civil service, Cabinet needed a clear legal 
statement.144  Yet ministers were not provided with the AG’s fuller, qualified 7th March advice, 
the conflicting legal arguments, or information regarding Blair’s determination of the 
‘material breach’ issue.  Though Straw, Hoon and Reid had seen Goldsmith’s fuller advice, 
other ministers remained unaware of it, including Short and Chancellor Gordon Brown ‘whose 
responsibilities were directly engaged.’145 
 
The AG had intended to explain his fuller, finely balanced advice to Cabinet, but was 
discouraged from doing so.  In a meeting between Blair and Goldsmith on 11th March the 
latter suggested that Cabinet should be given the full legal picture (‘the reality’) whilst Blair 
had emphasised ‘the need to avoid a detailed discussion [of this] in Cabinet’.146  Neither Blair 
nor Goldsmith could recall the details of this conversation.147  Then again, on 13th March Jack 
Straw discouraged the AG from explaining to Cabinet that the issues were ‘finely balanced’.148  
The AG claimed that this was not his recollection of the conversation,149  though Straw 
defended his comments by reiterating the military need for a clear answer, explaining that 
everyone knew the legal arguments were finely balanced and stressing the risks of Cabinet 
leaks.150   Ministerial views varied on whether Goldsmith’s full advice should have been 
provided; Gordon Brown and Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Secretary Margaret 
Beckett indicated it would not have changed their views.151   But Chief Secretary to the 
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Treasury, Paul Boateng, suggested it ‘would have been helpful’, and Clare Short claimed that 
excluding the full advice was misleading and resulted in her decision not to resign.152  In any 
event, Chilcot concluded that Cabinet ministers should have been provided with the AG’s full 
advice in writing.153 
 
Though Lord Goldsmith attended Cabinet to answer questions about his advice, ministers read 
his statement but, unusually, did not ask any questions about it and no detailed discussion 
ensued.154  The AG was not asked why his legal view had changed by any of the three ministers 
who were aware of his earlier opinion.  In short, Chilcot found ‘There was little appetite to 
question Lord Goldsmith about his advice’.155  The reasons for such apathy are unclear.  One 
major factor seems to be ministers’ understandings that the AG’s role at the meeting was 
simply to confirm whether or not military action was legal.156  Ministerial witnesses indicated 
that they were not inclined to open up the legal question or look behind the advice; they needed 
a ‘yes’ or ‘no’.157  Defenders also suggested that legality was only one aspect of the decision 
to endorse war, and that its moral and political aspects were issues that required more Cabinet 
attention, 158  though this overlooks the fact that engaging in military action contrary to 
international law raises profound moral and political questions per se.  But Lord Turnbull 
provided a further explanation; by this time – which was the first occasion the Cabinet was 
asked to take a decision on war – its options were extremely limited.  Ministers ‘were pretty 
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much imprisoned. … I don’t think they did have any choice’.159  Chilcot later claimed that 
ministers were not ‘obstructed in an active sense’, but were too ‘passive’.160  
 
On 17th March Jack Straw introduced the AG’s written answer to Parliament.161  Additionally, 
an FCO paper detailing Iraq’s failures to comply with UN obligations was sent to all MPs, 
though Chilcot noted that its claims were based on UK interpretations of intelligence and were 
subject to limitations.162  On 18th March the UK Parliament held an historic substantive debate 
and vote on whether to authorise military action in Iraq.  Members of Parliament voted on a 
motion in support of military action, with 412 M.P.s voting in favour, and 149 voting against.  
The author’s earlier research indicated that the AG’s decisive view that such action was lawful 
was an influential factor in this debate.163   
 
[4.2] Power/Knowledge Issues 
 
The presentation of the AG’s final statement entailed numerous power/knowledge dynamics, 
including those outlined in Parts 2-3.  Lord Goldsmith’s fuller advice remained unknown to 
both Cabinet and Parliament and this was a vital knowledge asymmetry upon which both 
bodies made their decisions to support war.  Additionally, both bodies were supplied with a 
highly partisan, closely managed, government-produced legal knowledge – the brief legal 
statement – upon which they based their decision.  But the fourth power/knowledge tactic of 
trading on expertise was particularly crucial at this final stage where the AG’s legal knowledge 
and the associated status of his speech were strategically exploited. 
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Foucault identified exclusions that organise various discourses, including limitations on who 
has the privileged right to speak on a particular subject. 164   Elsewhere, he noted an 
Enlightenment-era shift in which knowledge came to be gauged by ‘orthodoxy of source’, i.e. 
assessed primarily according to its ‘official’ or authoritative origins. 165   Regarding the 
domestic legality of military action, who spoke was a central issue; the AG was the individual 
lawyer assigned this privileged position.  His legal view (knowledge) enjoyed a definitive 
status with considerable power implications.  The AG’s written answer was presented to 
Cabinet, Parliament and the public, as a definitive, isolated statement of legal knowledge from 
the constitutionally authoritative source.  Government lawyers later claimed in evidence that 
its presentation was unorthodox, leading Chilcot to conclude that: ‘The decision that Lord 
Goldsmith would take the lead in explaining the Government’s legal position to Parliament, 
rather than the Prime Minister or responsible Secretary of State providing that explanation, 
was unusual.’166  Yet there were clear power benefits to ensuring the AG was perceived as 
having specific ownership of the legal statement, and conveniently distancing ministers such 
as Blair, Straw and Hoon from it.  The international legality of the war was the subject of 
intense debate and uncertainty, and in the days leading up to Lord Goldsmith’s statement there 
were media and parliamentary calls for the AG’s advice to be published.167  Number 10 
politically benefitted from the AG’s authoritative, expert standing and his constitutional status 
as the final arbiter of legality; the presentation of the written answer exploited this ‘orthodoxy 
of source’ and fostered a (temporary) edifice of legal certainty which had profound power 
effects in Parliament168 and Cabinet.169  The circumstances surrounding the AG’s legal advice 
                                                          
164  Foucault (n 11) 224-5.  See also: Edward Said, ‘Opponents, Audiences, Constituencies, and 
Community’, Critical Inquiry (1982), vol 9(1), 1-26, 2, 7-8. 
165 “The problem is now: Who is speaking, are they qualified to speak, at what level is the statement 
situated, what set can it be fitted into, and how and to what extent does it conform to other forms 
and other typologies of knowledge.”  Michel Foucault, Society Must be Defended (Penguin 2004) 
183-184. 
166 Chilcot Report (n 2) vol 5(5) [800], [811], [943]-[944]. 
167 ibid vol 5(5) [671]-[684]; [813]. 
168 Fountain of Honour (n 8) 301-5, 312. 





provide a textbook example of power producing (legal) knowledge, and then in turn exploiting 
this knowledge to engender power by constructing support for war. 
 
But, the Chilcot evidence begs Foucault’s questions: who was speaking?  What was the 
‘status’ of this crucial statement that military action in Iraq was internationally lawful?170  
Despite providing a temporary edifice of certainty, both the identity of the AG as speaker and 
the status of his clear legal statement were ambiguous.  The statement’s core purpose was to 
explain the case for military action strongly, unambiguously and clearly.171  It was making a 
legal argument, engaged in advocacy. 172   Chilcot deemed the text ‘a statement of the 
government’s legal position’; this was not ‘advice’.  But even as an argument, Chilcot deemed 
the written answer fundamentally lacking because it did not explain a key legal point on which 
it rested, namely ‘the legal basis of the conclusion that Iraq had failed to take ‘the final 
opportunity’ to comply with its disarmament obligations offered by resolution 1441.’173  Cathy 
Adams also claimed the 17th March text was not the AG’s ‘advice’, but simply an ‘argument’ 
based on his advice; thus using Goldsmith to present this was ‘a mistake’.174  It also went 
against wishes that the AG had expressed just days earlier, on 11th March, that he ‘did not 
want [Blair] to present [his fuller legal opinion] too positively. … he wished he could be 
clearer in his advice, but in reality it was nuanced.’175 
 
Presenting’ the legal position thus, entailed a highly strategic framing of the text; partisan 
argument was implicitly presented as authoritative, independent advice.  This presentation 
was facilitated by the AG’s official dual role as a government minister and legal adviser to the 
Crown.  The latter responsibility is non-ministerial and required the AG to act independently 
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of the Government;176 it is in this central ‘legal adviser’ role that the public, ministers and MPs 
looked to the AG to provide an independent, definitive view.  The Bar Council subsequently 
found that the AG was acting as a minister at this point,177 yet this party political role was not 
at the time articulated and instead his ‘legal adviser’ role was implicitly exploited.  In short, 
the AG was speaking as a minister stating an argument, though he was implicitly presented 
and understood by his audience as an independent adviser setting out his independent legal 
advice.  This raises interesting questions about the status of this final clear statement vis-à-vis 
the AG’s other writings, particularly his detailed 7th March advice.178  In particular, it seems 
that the final statement ultimately had formal legal effect, rather than the earlier, fuller advice 
upon which it was based; troops were engaged on the basis of the former rather than the latter 
(which had been deemed insufficiently certain).  Thus, the presentation of the written answer 
traded on AG’s impartial role and his legal expertise, both of which enjoyed a credibility and 
independent standing that were inconsistent with the aims and content of the text presented.  
In this sense Lord Goldsmith exemplified one of Foucault’s ‘specific intellectuals’ whose 
powers can ‘irrevocably destroy life’ in the service of the state.179 
 
[5] Post-Iraq Power/Knowledge Dynamics 
 
Though it represents a critical high watermark of power/knowledge exploitation - and 
constitutional subversion - the Iraq case study examined here is not an aberration; such 
dynamics remain endemic in the constitution.  Though there is less publicly available 
information about central government workings behind the scenes of post-Iraq military actions, 
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a brief survey shows similar power/knowledge tactics at play, albeit to a lesser degree.  
Practices such as the selective sharing of information and tailoring of informational contexts 
in which actors appraise issues of warfare continue,180 and the tactic of trading on legal 
expertise has been routinely employed to varying degrees.  For example, there were notable 
echoes of Iraq in the decision to undertake military engagement in Libya in 2011.  Here, the 
Foreign Affairs Select Committee found shortcomings in decision-making by the National 
Security Council (NSC) which had been formed to oversee defence strategy and to address 
problems with informality and minuting in the Iraq affair.  Though the select committee 
deemed the NSC ‘a clear improvement’ on the earlier informal Iraq-era processes, it 
highlighted limitations of this group established and chaired by Prime Minister David 
Cameron.  It noted Cameron’s ‘decisive role’, particularly when summing up the NSC position 
in favour of military intervention in Libya despite the concerns of senior intelligence and 
military chiefs present.181  It concluded that ‘the NSC mechanism failed to capture [well-
founded concerns] and bring them to the attention of the Cabinet when it ratified the NSC’s 
decisions.’182  Such findings indicate that enhancing formality and recording mechanisms in 
decision-making cannot automatically address power/knowledge disparities (e.g. between 
Prime Minister and Cabinet).  Rather, writing inevitably remains a site of political struggle, 
and the crucial issue continues to be control over the official minute or summary of a meeting, 
e.g. the terms in which it is recorded and, of course, what is not captured. 
 
A further similarity between the Iraq and 2011 Libyan actions was the government’s 
publication of a brief summary of the legal position.183  According to Murray and O’Donoghue, 
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‘Parliament’s access to little more than fragmentary legal advice would become a recurring 
feature of subsequent intervention debates.’184  On three further occasions government – 
specifically, the Prime Minister’s Office - provided Parliament with incomplete, ‘fragmentary’ 
information about the often-contested legal basis for military intervention.  The first, in the 
August 2013 parliamentary vote on engagement in Syria,185 was later criticised by Sands due 
to its direct parallels with the presentation of the text in the Iraq affair; both were brief single-
page summaries of the ‘best possible’ case for war, yet were incorrectly presented by prime 
ministers as ‘advice’.  Sands concluded that ‘In both cases I think the House was misled’,186 
though it should also be noted that the government was – exceptionally – defeated in the 2013 
Syria vote.187  The UK government also published legal summaries in September 2014, when 
it participated in air strikes against ISIS at the Iraqi government’s request,188 and in April 2018 
when it took part in air strikes to disarm the Assad regime in Syria.189  Parliament supported 
both interventions.190 
 
The provision of brief legal summaries has been justified on the basis that the AG’s full advice 
to government is confidential as a matter of constitutional convention and the possibility of 
publication would inhibit the candidness of advice given. 191   But the power/knowledge 
analysis undertaken in this article nevertheless highlights two problems with this trend of 
providing legal ‘summaries’.  First, the specific status and purpose of the legal texts presented 
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to parliaments debating military action remain ambiguous192 and therefore exploitable.193  In 
particular, upon which text is military action ultimately authorised?  Does, and indeed should, 
a government’s summary of the ‘best’ legal case have any domestic ‘legal’ status?  Under the 
current system MPs debating crucial warfare issues under information asymmetries must 
somehow be alert to whether a government summary may distort or misrepresent more 
complex, qualified advice194 that parliament has neither access to, nor the expertise to assess.  
In these circumstances, such texts are of limited assistance and should be treated as any other 
partisan government argument.  
 
Second, even if the distinction between a brief legal summary and the AG’s independent, full 
advice is clear to all actors, it will be generally understood that the former is founded upon 
and bears some similarity to the latter.  In this sense, even a legal summary indirectly trades 
upon the status of an AG role that is inherently susceptible to political influence.  Recent AG, 
Jeremy Wright appeared to defend the role on this basis, agreeing that it must be ministerial 
as its position ‘at the intersection of law and politics’ enables the AG to give government the 
advice it ‘needs’. 195   Yet this dual dimension of the AG’s role that aids government 
convenience also necessarily makes it subject to power/knowledge inequalities and subtle, 
wider tactics of ministerial influence.  While power/knowledge dynamics are an inherent, 
pervasive feature of all contemporary political systems, the Iraq case study reveals their 
remarkable capacity to aid the construction of a legal text the Prime Minister ‘needed’.  The 
subsequent practice of routinely publishing legal summaries remains problematic, particularly 
when viewed in the light of the UK government’s strategic shifting of the primary justificatory 
forum for military action away from the international UNSC to a domestic Parliament over 
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which it has more control.196  In such circumstances, the AG’s legal advice becomes a – 
arguably the - crucial check on lawfulness.  These post-Iraq examples further demonstrate the 
systemic challenges of maintaining meaningful checks and balances in warfare matters where 




Ultimately, as in the case of the discredited intelligence dossier (with which it bears marked 
parallels)197 the AG’s Iraq war legal advice lends weight to Foucault’s claim that ‘If we truly 
wish to know knowledge, … to apprehend it at its root, its manufacture, we must not look to 
philosophers but to politicians”.198   The Chilcot evidence demonstrated that four related 
dynamics, all of which entailed the reciprocal relationship between power and knowledge, 
operated cumulatively to construct the legal ‘green light’ that the Iraq invasion depended upon.  
Chilcot revealed in stark detail that the path to war was highly precarious, and Blair’s 
maintenance of fragile political support rested entirely on an array of finely calibrated circles 
of who knew what, and (vitally) when.  Furthermore, available evidence indicates that the four 
power/knowledge dynamics discussed here have continued to operate in post-Iraq military 
actions, where the Prime Minister still enjoys privileged access to and management of 
information vis-à-vis Cabinet and Parliament, as well as the benefit of ostensibly legal texts 
summarising international law that shape domestic debate on warfare.  This surely represents 
a serious ongoing challenge to constitutional integrity and effective decision-making in 
matters of warfare. 
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Though constitutional discourse entails the fiction of ‘the solid and fundamental unit of the 
author and the work’,199 the Chilcot material indicates that in one sense, the Iraq ‘green light’ 
text was not simply the sole product of the individual AG with his ‘single pen’.200  Instead, a 
range of power influences – e.g. the tactically-timed drip-feed of carefully curated surrounding 
knowledge, the silent adjustment of pre-interpretive approaches on the margins of legal 
discourse - took effect through the AG to construct the text published in his name.  In this way, 
intangible power coalesced into the legal ‘authoritarian monologue’201 upon which the Iraq 
deployment hinged, via the conduit of an AG who, despite initial attempts at resistance, was 
transformed in the process.  Ultimately, power/knowledge dynamics produced not just ‘words 
that maketh murder’ but also the leading lawyer who, it seems, came to believe in and later 
defend them.202  More generally, Lord Goldsmith’s Iraq u-turn highlights a disparity between 
(on the one hand) the liberal-constitutional model of the AG as autonomous, independent legal 
adviser upholding the rule of law,203 and (on the other hand) ongoing complex, subtle, political 
micro-practices that inevitably take effect on the office-holder and work against or undercut 
this formal fiction.   
 
Yet, despite Foucault’s denial that power is located in the possession of specific individuals, 
Chilcot’s findings do implicate the Prime Minister and his team in the unsatisfactory processes 
that led to the AG’s Iraq legal advice.  In later comments to a select committee, Chilcot noted 
Blair’s personal dominance in Cabinet and agreed that the concentration of power in modern 
prime ministers bears resemblance to Louis XIV’s claim ‘I am the state’.204  So whilst the 
King may no longer be above the law, the Iraq war shows that his modern successor - the 
                                                          
199 Foucault (n 178) 101, 107-8, 118-119. 
200 Campbell transcript (n 20) 79.  Campbell referred to ‘the person who … had the single pen’ when 
describing the role of John Scarlett, Head of Joint Intelligence Committee, in the production of the 
intelligence dossier presented in September 2002. 
201 Peter Goodrich, ‘Rhetoric as Jurisprudence: An Introduction to the Politics of Legal Language’ 
(1984) 4 OJLS, 90, 99. 
202 Goldsmith transcript (n 31) 245-6. 
203‘Ministerial Code’ (Cabinet Office, October 2011) [6.4].  This passage does not feature in the 2018 
Code.   





Prime Minister205 - can nonetheless exploit power/knowledge dynamics to influence an AG’s 
legal text to which he is subject.  Furthermore, post-Iraq military actions highlight the Prime 
Minister’s enduring privileged position in this area.  In this context at least, it seems that the 
king’s head remains firmly intact.206  So it goes.   
 
                                                          
205 Fountain of Honour (n 8) 290-4. 
206 Foucault, Power/Knowledge (n 9) 139-40. 
